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SYNDROMES LEADING TO FAILURE:  
AN EXPLORATORY RESEARCH 
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Abstract
Prediction of corporate failure research typically focused on the design of multivariate 
prediction models for the discrimination between failed and non-failed firms. This research at-
tracted some criticism due to the inability to formulate generally applicable models. Several rea-
sons may have led to the impossibility of formulating such models: it has been argued that firms 
suffering financial distress may have incentives to manipulate accounting information in order to 
increase users’ confidence; statistical techniques could over-adjust prediction models; and finally, 
the existence of different failure processes is not considered by prior research. 
The main objective of the present research is to investigate the unique characteristics of 
failed companies, the reasons for each particular failure and the presence of different failure proc-
esses.
The present study aims to be the first step in the opening of a new stage in the develop-
ment of a theoretical framework on corporate failure. It is assumed that there exist different paths 
to failure, instead of a simple differentiation between healthy and failed firms. This is the main 
contribution of the paper, which is relevant to both researchers and practitioners. It opens up new 
possibilities for future research, following new experimental designs. For practitioners, it consti-
tutes a new framework for the development of decision-aid tools (raising the opportunity to use 
decision making systems based on different rules or models for different paths).  
Key words: Corporate failure, syndromes, quality of financial information. 
JEL classification: G33, G11, M41. 
Previous evidence and research objectives  
In 1968, Altman published his well known Z-score, which measures the proximity of a 
firm to corporate failure. Z-score is a lineal multivariate model, constructed by using the statistical 
differences observed between organizations belonging to two different samples (failed vs. non-
failed) and paired by size and sector. Z-score neither explains why some firms fail nor replicates 
the analysts’ decision process, but increases the efficiency of the analysis effort by reducing the 
time devoted to analyze firms with very high or very low failure probabilities and thus increasing 
the time devoted to those in the “grey zone”. 
During the following 30 years, this experimental design was applied to other periods, in-
dustries and countries, using similar, or slightly different, statistical tools, variables, time horizons 
and sample designs – literature reviews can be found in Altman (1983), Zavgren (1983), Jones 
(1987), Dimitras et al. (1996), Altman & Narayanan (1997), Laitinen & Kankaanpää (1999) and 
Balcaen and Ooghe (2006). The experimental design and the instrumental focus remained un-
changed throughout. Systematically, samples of failed and non-failed firms were compared, and 
those models that could achieve a classificatory success comparable to that obtained by Altman 
(1968) were labeled as good models. Discriminant variables and model selection were considered 
empirical questions that should be solved by choosing those with higher classificatory success 
(Jones, 1987; Bartley & Boardman, 1990). The expected benefits justified the use of inappropriate 
statistical tools, data mining or the lack of interest in the development of a general theory of corpo-
rate failure (Joy & Tollefson, 1975; Pinches, 1980; Belkaoui, 1980; Zmijewsky, 1984; Piesse & 
Wood, 1992; Charitou et al., 2004; Diaz Martínez et al., 2005).  
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However, the criticism of the typical experimental design was not caused by any of the 
reasons stated above, but from its inability to develop generally applicable models that could pro-
vide adequate rates of success in samples that were different from those used in their formulation 
(Begley et al., 1996; Sung et al., 1999; Grice & Dugan, 2001). Under these circumstances the in-
strumental objective may not be reached, due to the risk associated with the use of the models in 
decisions that only admit low error rates. At this stage, the absence of an underlying theory and the 
impossibility to formulate generally accepted decision rules due to the difficult interpretation of 
the results, contributed to the crisis of those models. As Balcaen and Ooghe (2006, 87) suggest, the 
definition of failure itself is arbitrary, and “may result in models with misleading classification 
power and weak predictive usefulness in practice”.
Different factors might explain the instability of the models and the reduction of their 
predictive accuracy. It has been argued that firms facing financial tensions or situations close to 
failure have incentives to manipulate financial accounting information to increase user confidence
(Beaver, 1968; Beneish, 1997; Rosner, 2003). Another explanation is that statistical techniques 
over-adjust predictive models in order to reach the maximum classificatory success within the 
sample, but reduce the external validity of the models. The pursuit for the maximization of predic-
tive success encouraged researchers to systematically contrast the predictive ability of a wide 
range of variables and models, usually without the appropriate theoretical support. Under such 
circumstances, it is presumable that the selected model could be significantly influenced by spuri-
ous statistic relationships, present in the concrete sample of firms used (Zavgren, 1983; Hair et al., 
1999). Finally, Laitinen (1991), states that many of the errors on the predictive models are origi-
nated by the incorrect hypothesis, underlying the experimental design, that there is a unique proc-
ess that leads to failure.  
In order to overcome the stated limitations, the main objective of the present paper is to 
propose a first step towards the development of a new theoretical framework of corporate failure, 
identifying different processes, paths or syndromes of failure.  
By investigating the characteristics and the financial situation of failing firms and the fac-
tors affecting each particular failure, the existence of different process driving to failure is inferred. 
A formal taxonomy and rules to classify firms into each category are developed. Finally, a confir-
matory statistical analysis is performed. 
A proper identification of different processes, paths or syndromes of failure might open 
promising avenues for research by means of the development of a new theoretical framework. The 
consideration of those syndromes offers a range of opportunities for future research and for the 
subsequent development of decision aid tools. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section is devoted to present the sample 
selection procedure. The main objective of the paper is approached in the following section, where 
the grouping of the cases and the resulting syndromes are presented. The paper ends with a con-
firmatory analysis and the conclusions section.
Sample selection 
The sample of failed1 firms was obtained from the data bases SABI (database comprising 
financial statements for a wide range of firms) and Baratz (database including summaries of press 
news). Financial firms were excluded from the analysis, due to their special characteristics. In or-
der to be included in the sample, firms were required to have relevant liabilities and sufficient size 
to disclose standard and audited financial statements. To obtain a relevant and valid sample the 
following conditions were required: 
1) The bankruptcy petition should have been filed, at least, two years before the empiri-
cal study was performed. This requirement allowed identifying a reliable sample of 
non-failed firms as control group. The date of the bankruptcy protection filing was 
obtained from Baratz.
                                                          
1 A firm was considered failed when a bankruptcy petition or a repayment plan is presented, using a juridical definition of 
failure.
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2) Accounting data for the 3 periods before filing should be available. We considered that 
the accounts had been released before filing if the financial statements were presented 
at least six months earlier. Accounting data were obtained from SABI, public register 
offices and Spanish Securities and Exchange Commission (CNMV) database.  
3) Financial Statements of those 3 years should have been audited (data obtained from 
SABI or from the public register offices). 
4) There should not be previous filings, bankruptcies or interruptions of the activity of 
the selected firms before the one under control (information: Baratz or audit reports). 
This constraint tried to avoid corruption in the sample. 
5) At the time of the filing date, or at least at the end of the preceding year, recognized 
liabilities should be relevant (we stated a minimum limit of 6 million €). 
These restrictions were met by 46 firms. From this initial sample, 5 firms were rejected, 
due to adverse audit opinions (the financial statements did not present a true and fair view) in, at 
least, two years. In consequence, the sample was composed of 41 failed firms that filed for bank-
ruptcy protection. The total amount of liabilities of the filings was 1.252 millions €. The average 
of liabilities was 31 millions €. The minimum limit for liabilities was 6 millions € and the maxi-
mum was 144 millions €. 
For each failed firm, a comparable healthy company was chosen, taking into account the 
following restrictions and conditions:  
a) Same industry, measured by the first four digits of the Spanish Classification of Eco-
nomic Activities (CNAE93). 
b) Similar size, measured by total assets and net sales. 
c) Annual accounts should be audited without qualifications in any year of the sample 
period. 
d) All accounting data for all the years in the sample period should be available. 
e) There should be no evidence of later filings for the control firms (confirmed with 
SABI and Baratz news until four years after). 
The control sample consisted of 40 non-failed firms that fulfilled all these conditions. 
Only for one failed firm it was impossible to find a “partner” that met the requirement of unquali-
fied audit report for all the period. 
Grouping Cases: syndromes 
One of the major reasons that may have led to the impossibility of formulating generally 
applicable models is the potential existence of different failure processes (syndromes). As Balcaen 
and Ooghe (2006, 78-79) indicate, the classic failure prediction models do not treat company fail-
ure as a process, which results in serious consequences as “the relative importance of the variables 
and the ex-ante predictive accuracy of the model will be implicitly determined by the frequency of 
occurrence of the different phases of the failure process and the different kinds of failure paths in 
the estimation sample of failing firms”. In this line, our main aim is to identify failure paths or 
syndromes for failed firms.  
As theoretical starting point for such analysis, the model suggested by Beaver (1966), 
slightly modified, was used. We considered that the financial failure occurs when the debtor is 
unable to meet the financial obligations. Given that any creditor would defer the collecting of the 
debt (or to lend more funds) if he/she is sufficiently compensated for it and if there are enough 
warranties of recovery, it could be argued that a firm would not fail if the external agents do rely in 
the firm capacity to meet its financial compromises in the future. Even, if some of the creditors 
preferred to cancel their credits, the existence of other agents relying on the firm opens the possi-
bility to borrow the funds from those agents. Favorable prospects would not only increase leverage 
capacity, but would also attract new investors. Therefore, financial failure occurs when the reli-
ance of the creditors deteriorates.  
In our opinion, this confidence is based upon:  
(i) Net equity: the difference “real assets less liabilities” is the last warranty for the 
creditors. Losses expectations diminish this guarantee.  
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(ii) Expected fund flows, leverage capability and non-operating assets, which are the re-
sources that could be used to meet financial compromises.  
The analysis of failed firms rests on the former hypothesis. In order to identify failure 
processes, an individual financial analysis of each case (failed firm) was performed.  
For each case, a set of variables was calculated for a period comprising three years before 
failure. These variables included information about profitability, leverage, debt coverage, etc.  The 
next step consisted of an individual analysis of each case, developed by a team of researchers with 
an appropriate degree of expertise in financial analysis. The outcome of the process resulted in a 
set of reports. Those reports described the actual situation and the previous development of the 
firm, highlighting the appropriate variables traditionally used in financial analysis and those that 
displayed relevant variations in the periods prior to failure.  
The analysts, following a modus operandi similar to that used in medical diagnosis, 
looked for the symptoms that could explain the development of the firm and could discriminate 
one “disease” from another. The advantage of such procedure, particularly when there is no prior 
knowledge of the syndromes, is that allows paying attention to nuances that could be ignored by 
statistical tools such as cluster analysis. As no prior theory exists in order to define the syndromes, 
the potential risk of losing objectivity is compensated by the relevance of the results obtained, that 
could not be achieved by using statistical tools.   
The analysis of the reports confirmed that failed firms did not seem to be in similar situa-
tions neither followed a unique process to failure. For a considerable percentage of firms (close to 
50%) the failure could be predicted by using the most usual ratios. The vast majority of these firms 
obtained negative fund flows that resulted in negative, or very low, net equity. 
The failure for the rest of the sample did not follow the same path. A second analysis was 
performed paying attention (and systematically comparing) more specific variables, such as mar-
gin evolution, operating turnover & days, relevant expenses and revenues, liquidity and operating 
ratios, etc. After a detailed examination of the cases, it could be observed that a considerable group 
of firms (12 cases) presented a sudden degradation of debt coverage variables after a period of 
significant investments (growth in assets) financed with debt.  
The rest of the cases seemed to respond to different circumstances. A small group of 
firms had a relatively stable position, although the profitability and times-interest-earned ratios 
showed low values.  
Once the different groups were broadly identified, more detailed rules of thumb were devel-
oped in order to allow the adscription of the failed firms to each syndrome. The strict application of 
the rules of thumb resulted in the immediate classification of two thirds of the cases in very homoge-
neous sets. The resulting classification consisted of 3 categories, labeled and described as follows: 
– Black hole (12 cases, 30%). These firms present negative fund flows from operations 
for, at least, 2 years before failing. In the last year, the equity becomes very low, even negative. 
Ordinary losses clearly diminish the net equity guarantee. However, net equity does not always 
show a decreasing trend, since it is usual that those firms issue new capital, adjust asset values, or 
try to raise extraordinary revenues. Nevertheless, all those resources are quickly absorbed by ordi-
nary losses. 
Years before the failing date, those firms present a very weak financial situation. The per-
sistence of this weakness should have been understood, by investors and creditors, as a signal of a 
high risk of failure. Notwithstanding, new funds are invested in those firms in the years before 
failure. In our opinion, these firms can be detected and must be avoided. 
– Failed growth (10 cases, 25%). These firms exhibit appreciable assets growth in the last 
years (annual average higher that 10%). This growth is financed through substantial increases in 
debt. Funds flows from operations, however, do not grow and, at the end, do fall to a level below 
the starting point. Consequently, interest and debt coverage worsen significantly, and firms are 
unable to meet their financial obligations. Unlike "black hole" firms funds flows and earnings are 
usually positive in the three years before failing. 
It is difficult to detect the probability of failure of such firms far in advance since deterio-
ration of financial situation is only evident one or, at most, two years before failing. In our opin-
ion, the only symptom of the risk undertaken by these firms rests on their rapid size increase. Un-
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der such circumstances, decision makers should (I) give a detailed attention to the development of 
firms with excessively rapid size increases financed with debt, (II) diversify investments in growth 
firms, and/or (III) raise the risk premium for this kind of firms. 
– Setback (4 cases, 10%). Firms in this group have low profitability (return on assets is 
never higher than 2 percentage points over average interest rate) and debt/interest coverage is very 
low. In the last period they suffer relevant losses that consume the retained earnings and drive fund 
flows to negative. Setback firms usually have positive earnings until the year before     the failing 
date, like failed growth firms. The difference comes from the absence of assets growth and from a 
weaker departure situation.  
Failure probability for those firms was easily sensed several years before failing, due to 
low interest and debt coverage. However, it is difficult to anticipate the definite date of failure be-
cause it is usual for these firms to generate positive earnings and to show relatively stable figures 
that do not seem to point to degradation in the financial situation. In situations like these, decision 
makers should avoid firms with low interest/debt coverage, at least when these indicators do not 
reveal a favorable trend. 
There were 15 firms (one third of the sample) that did not conform strictly to all the re-
quired rules to be classified into the former categories. Nevertheless, none of them evidenced be-
haviors that were against our theory of failure. Out of them: 
i 7 exhibited very similar features to those of the categorized firms; although they did 
not comply with one of the characteristics necessary to be included (4 were similar to 
black hole, 2 to failed growth and 1 to setback).  
i 4 were hardly profitable (return on assets was lower than average interest rate and/or 
was rapidly and gradually diminishing) and unable to meet their financial compro-
mises and new investments. 
i 2 were highly leveraged (equity almost non-existent); ordinary losses in any period 
and/or creditors refusal to renew financial support led them to failure.  
i Finally, one had a highly negative equity several years before failing date and other 
suffered strong losses, from which it could not recover. 
Regarding the audit reports, it is interesting to note that 83% of going concern qualifica-
tions were found in the reports of black hole or similar firms. This is quite relevant given that 
those firms only represent 40% of failed firms. 
Empirical confirmation 
In this section, our aim is to confirm the validity of the proposed classification by using 
statistical tests. Nominal regressions (multilogit) were found to be the most appropriate technique. 
This tool is useful to classify cases, based on several variables, into more than one category when 
those categories are not ordinal. In the present case there were 4 categories: healthy firms and 3 
syndromes. The output is a set of n-1 models, over a total of n categories, where each model esti-
mates the probability of a case to be included in the category. 
In previous research that estimates classical statistical prediction models the variable se-
lection is usually empirically based, lacking theoretical foundation and therefore preventing for a 
better selection (Balcaen and Ooghe, 2006). In the current research, we undertake an attempt to 
overcome this limitation since the theoretical definition of the syndromes allows a theoretically 
based variable selection. Therefore, the set of independent variables was obtained taking into ac-
count the theoretical definition of each syndrome. 
In order to avoid multicollinearity problems, a previous correlation analysis was per-
formed. From the results of this test, those variables with redundant information content were fil-
tered. The set of variables finally used was: 
R23  Equity/Total Assets 
R29C (Negotiated Total Financing + Other Financing (with no explicit cost) – Non-
Operating Assets)/Funds Flows From Operations 
R30  Earnings before Interest & Tax/Interest Expenses 
R39  Return on Assets 
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T01 Assets Growth  
T03 Operating Revenue Growth 
For failed firms, the data used were obtained by adjusting the variables by the audit quali-
fications1.
The first model included all the firm-year observations in a panel data. Initially, there were 
another two possibilities: (I) to perform 3 models, one for each distance to failure, and (II) to intro-
duce distance as another independent variable. Given that the date of failure is unknown in advance 
for the decision maker, it is unrealistic to use distance as a variable because it introduces information 
in the model that is obviously not available. Therefore, both alternatives were dismissed.  
A summary of the general model and its goodness of fit are given in Table 1. 
Table 1 
General model 
Category  N Goodness of fit Pseudo R2
B. Hole 30 
F. Growth 30 
Setback 11 
Chi2
302.91
Cox & Snell 
80.7%
Healthy 113 
N. 184 
Sig.
0.0000
Nagelkerke
86.1%
In general terms, the model is highly significant (Chi2 sig.<1%), obtaining high pseudo R2
values. Table 2 presents the 3 models (n-1). Each model presents the probability of a case to be 
labeled in the category associated to that model. Those models are not mutually exclusive; there-
fore, more than one model could show probabilities over 50% for a concrete case. 
Table 2 
Multilogit model 
Groupings (n-1) Variables B Typical Error Wald Sig. 
T01 -0.368 1.623 0.051 0.821 
T03 0.807 0.954 0.717 0.397 
R23 -7.661 2.198 12.151 0.000 
R29C 0.010 0.008 1.547 0.214 
R30 -0.235 0.116 4.077 0.043 
B. Hole 
R39 -9.282 7.044 1.736 0.188 
T01 2.317 1.152 4.047 0.044 
T03 0.460 0.912 0.255 0.614 
R23 -5.413 1.489 13.220 0.000 
R29C 0.008 0.008 1.020 0.312 
R30 -0.060 0.043 1.982 0.159 
F. Growth 
R39 -3.164 4.895 0.418 0.518 
                                                          
1 Previous research indicates that the reliability of the accounting data used to calculate failure prediction models should be 
a major concern. For instance, results in Abad et al. (2003) indicate that audit reports are able to quantify manipulations on 
accounting information in close to 20% of the financial statements of firms suffering financial distress. In those firms, the 
variables commonly used in financial statement analysis are significantly different before and after adjustments made fol-
lowing audit qualifications. Therefore, users operating with samples obtained from large financial databases must take into 
account that accounting information disclosed by failed firms usually receives adverse opinions or relevant audit qualifica-
tions and, consequently, is unreliable or biased. 
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Table 2 (continued) 
Groupings (n-1) Variables B Typical Error Wald Sig. 
T01 -0.416 1.785 0.054 0.816 
T03 -1.946 1.793 1.178 0.278 
R23 -9.037 2.533 12.730 0.000 
R29C 0.008 0.008 1.173 0.279 
R30 -0.261 0.169 2.396 0.122 
Setback
R39 2.226 7.618 0.085 0.770 
The interpretation of parameters is not as easy as in a linear regression (the output of the 
model is the estimated probability of a case to be labeled in a concrete grouping, see Greene, 
1998), although the sign of the relationship has the same meaning.  
Significant variables for black hole model are: R23 (equity/total assets) and R30 (earnings be-
fore interest & tax/interest expenses). Failed growth model includes as significant variables T01 (assets 
growth) and R23 (equity/total assets); finally the significant variable for setback model is R23.  
The default breaking point to consider a case in a concrete category is 50%. Once the es-
timations are obtained, it is possible to compare the output indicated by the model with the a priori 
grouping. Table 3 shows the comparison between the forecasted and the observed grouping. 
Table 3 
Comparison “forecasted – observed” 
Forecasted 
Observed
B. Hole F. Growth Setback Healthy 
% correct 
B. Hole 25 2* 0 3 83.3% 
F. Growth 2*  10* 0 18 33.3% 
Setback 3 0 2 6 18.2% 
Healthy 0 1 1 111 98.2% 
% global 16.3% 7.1% 1.6% 75.0% 80.4% 
* In 2 cases, the assigned probability for black hole and failed growth is 100%. If we consider both 
cases as correctly assigned, the success indexes raise.  
A case is classified into a group when the probability obtained in the respective model is 
higher than 50%. As it can be seen from the table, the global success percentage is greater than 
80%. It is especially remarkable that close to 100% of healthy firms were correctly grouped as 
well as more than 80% of black hole firms. For the other two syndromes, the classificatory success 
is quite low. In order to study in deep those results, Table 4 presents the number of unsuccessful 
classifications by the distance to failing date.  
Table 4 
Unsuccessful classifications, segmented by distance 
Distance Healthy(H)
B. Hole 
(BH)
Failed growth 
(FG) 
Setback
(SB)
Previously un-
classified
Year – 1 0 1 H 4 H 0 5 H 
Year – 2 1 SB 0 6 H 3 H 6 H 
Year – 3 1 FG 2 H, 1 FG 8 H 3 H 5 H 
Total number of errors 2 4 18 6 16 
Total number of observations  113 30 30 11 45 
H: healthy, FG: failed growth, SB: setback, BH: black hole. 
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Type II error is only made with one firm (over 40). This healthy firm was erroneously 
classified as setback in the year -2 (probability, 64%) and as failed growth in the year -3 (probabil-
ity, 75%). In the year -1 was correctly classified. Regarding type I errors, among black hole firms, 
there is only one mistake in the year previous to the failing date (this firm is correctly classified in 
-2 and -3 years with a 100% probability). There are no mistakes for black hole firms in the -2 year, 
and the year when more unsuccessful classifications occurred is the most distant (year -3, with 3 
mistakes).
For failing growth firms, the percentage of correct classifications is not so high, although 
increases as the failing date approaches. All setback firms were correctly classified in the last year 
(-1). This success rate diminishes as the distance is higher.  
Finally, we performed forecasts also for those firms that were not grouped initially. We 
considered that the classification was successful when the firm was labeled as failed, with inde-
pendence of the concrete syndrome. The success rates are as follows: 66% for year -1, 60% for -2 
and only 30% in the year -3. For this group those firms that were similar to black hole were once 
again classified with a higher success rate. In this line, for those 4 firms (12 observations firm-
year) there were only 2 mistakes (both in the -3 year). One was considered healthy, and the other 
was classified as failed, but in other group.    
It is necessary to have all the values for all the variables included in the model in order to 
be able to make the model based classification. In 7 cases (firm-year) we were not able to obtain 
information for year -4 (needed to build trend ratios). In other 4 cases, R29c presented missing 
values. For those cases, two alternative models that considered the available variables were calcu-
lated. The result of the classification obtained can be summarized as follows: all the healthy (3), 
black hole (3) and setback (1) firms were correctly identified. The unsuccessful classifications are 
all concentrated in firms that could not be previously included in any group (3 mistakes, 1 suc-
cess). In general terms, we obtained a 73% of classificatory success.  
Results above suggest that it is possible to identify healthy and black hole firms with a 
high rate of success. However, the implicit characteristics of the two other syndromes make it dif-
ficult to predict the failure more than 1 year in advance; this is not surprising given that the defini-
tion of such syndromes implies that those firms are very similar to any other healthy firm until the 
year prior to failure.  
Concluding remarks 
The main objective of this paper was to investigate the unique characteristics of failed 
firms, the factors affecting each particular failure, and the existence of different processes driving 
to failure. 
We performed case studies for each firm in the sample (qualitative analysis) in order to 
investigate the causes of each failure and the possible identification of syndromes. This analysis 
allowed us to classify two thirds of the firms in the sample, in three different categories: black 
hole, failed growth and setback. 
“Black hole” firms have a very weak financial situation (negative funds flows from opera-
tions, very low/negative equity), which is indicative of a high risk of failure. This firms can be 
detected and should be avoided. 
Unlike “black hole” firms, failure probability of “failed growth” firms is difficult to detect 
far in advance, since the deterioration of its financial situation becomes evident one or two, at the 
most, years before failure. In our opinion, the only indication of the risk undertaken by these firms 
lies in their rapid size increase. Under such circumstances, decision makers should:  
i avoid firms with excessively rapid size increases; 
i diversify investments in growth firms; 
i raise the risk premium for this kind of firms. 
Failure probability of “setback” firms was easily sensed several years before failing, due 
to low interest and debt coverage. However, it is difficult to anticipate the definite failing date be-
cause it is usual for these firms to generate positive earnings and to show relatively stable figures 
that do not seem to point to degradation in the financial situation. In situations like these, decision 
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makers should avoid firms with low interest and debt coverage, at least when these indicators do 
not reveal a favorable trend. 
Finally, statistical tools (quantitative analysis) were used as a validation technique. The 
result of nominal regressions (multivariate analysis) allowed achieving a high percentage of suc-
cess in the classification of black hole firms and healthy firms. Only one (over 40) healthy firm 
was labeled as failed. The percentage of correct classifications of black hole firms exceeded 80%, 
with the errors concentrated in year -3. 
We found those results supporting our hypothesis on failure processes, showing empirical 
differences between syndromes. The classificatory success is quite different between categories: in 
black hole firms, the percentage of correct classifications is high. However, for the other syn-
dromes, those percentages are significant in the year prior to failure. Nevertheless, the difference 
in the classificatory success is not against our failure theory, but quite the opposite, setback and 
failed growth firms are similar to any normal firm until a concrete event changes their financial 
equilibrium.   
The identification of different syndromes, or paths, leading to failure could be of rele-
vance for research and decision making. Regarding research, it implies a paradigm shift, and opens 
the possibility to follow new experimental designs. Concerning decision making, it (a) allows to 
detect and avoid black hole firms and firms in which risk could be assessed and diversified; and 
(b) raises the opportunity to use decision making systems based on rules. Multinomial models, 
whose output is an estimation of the probability of failure, are useful in order to implement internal 
classification models according to Basel II.  
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